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FREE SPEECH FOR SOME: THE NLRA, SECONDARY BOYCOTTS, AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
Seth Kennedy, Chicago-Kent College of Law 
 
 
 
“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials 
accountable to the people …. Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment 
stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are 
restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. As 
instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated. Speech restrictions based on the identity 
of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.” 
--Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) 
 
 Imagine three people standing on a public sidewalk in front of a Best Buy store, each 
holding a sign attached to a long wooden post. One, a Best Buy employee, holds a sign reading 
“DON’T SHOP AT BEST BUY! Best Buy sells electronics produced by child labor!”; the 
second, also a Best Buy employee, holds a sign reading “BUY IPHONES HERE! Guaranteed 
lowest prices!”; the third, who has no affiliation with Best Buy, holds a sign identical to the first 
person’s child labor protest sign. American labor law currently turns this scenario into an absurd 
game of “One Of These Things Is Not Like The Other.” Both the Best Buy employee who 
encourages shoppers to take advantage of the store’s low prices and the third party encouraging 
consumers to boycott the store over its support of child labor are protected by the First 
Amendment and would not be open to any liability. Under current law, however, the Best Buy 
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employee who encourages consumers to boycott the store based on product manufacturers’ labor 
policies violates the National Labor Relations Act and is not protected by the First Amendment.
1
 
 By encouraging customers to boycott the store because it sells goods at the center of a 
labor dispute, the first Best Buy employee engages in what is referred to as a secondary boycott 
or secondary picket. Best Buy itself is not the center of the labor dispute, but is still being 
picketed and boycotted because it sells products made by a company under dispute. Under 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), it is an illegal unfair labor 
practice for a labor organization to engage in boycotts or pickets against a “neutral” third party 
because of a labor dispute with a different “primary” target. In other words, a union and its 
members cannot picket or boycott one company in order to force its hand in dealings with other 
businesses. In the Best Buy example, the boycotters’ target would be the electronics 
manufacturers, not Best Buy itself; Best Buy is a neutral third party. The employee-sanctioned 
boycott of Best Buy in this hypothetical is precisely the type of activity that §8(b)(4) aims to 
proscribe. 
 This ban raises serious constitutional questions under the First Amendment – questions 
which the Supreme Court has routinely used the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to dodge. 
The American legal system has routinely held that non-labor boycotts and pickets, both primary 
and secondary, with political goals are protected political activity; labor boycotts, on the other 
hand, are considered commercial or economic speech and are much more heavily restricted. The 
result of this distinction is that §8(b)(4)’s ban on secondary activity has been justified by the 
courts despite the fact that it explicitly restricts speech by virtue of its content and its speaker. 
                                                          
1
 This scenario is loosely based on a hypothetical proposed in James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, The 
Thirteenth Amendment, And The Right To Organize In The 21st Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941,950-951 (1999). 
Pope’s hypothetical uses Furbys as the subject of the picket signs. While the specific targets of the picket signs in 
Pope’s hypothetical have been made more general here, the identities of the speakers, the messages of the signs, 
and the legal conclusions remain intact. 
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Activity which would be protected political speech when made by a non-labor speaker becomes 
impermissible commercial activity purely by virtue of the fact that the speaker is a labor 
organization. The Supreme Court has found creative methods to avoid conclusively ruling on the 
constitutionality of this ban, but the issues are unavoidable on the face of the NLRA’s plain 
language. 
 This paper argues that the NLRA’s ban on secondary union pickets and boycotts should 
be struck down as unconstitutional. Section I provides a brief overview of organized labor’s role 
in American jurisprudence, from its early days as a criminal conspiracy to interfere with private 
contracts to the NLRA’s codification of workers’ statutory right to organize and the Labor-
Management Relations Act’s limitations on that right. Section II illustrates the National Labor 
Relations Board and Supreme Court decisions which have shaped the legal doctrine regarding 
secondary union activity. Section III traces the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence which 
distinguishes “economic” secondary union activity from other “political” secondary activity, and 
argues that such a distinction is tantamount to unconstitutional content-based restrictions on 
speech. Section IV focuses on the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, most 
significantly its landmark Citizens United decision, and argues that this Court is primed to strike 
down §8(b)(4) for impermissibly restricting speech based on the speaker’s associational identity. 
 
I. The People, United, Will Sometimes Be Defeated: A Brief History of American Labor Law 
 The legal history of organized labor has always been an uphill battle for labor rights. In 
the early days, most collective action by employees was frowned upon by the courts. The case 
typically considered to be the origin of the “labor law” field was the 1806 case of 
Commonwealth v. Pullis, commonly referred to as the Philadelphia Cordwainers case. In late 
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1805, the journeymen shoemakers in Philadelphia collectively engaged in a work stoppage in 
order to compel a higher wage. They were charged with common law conspiracy in the Mayor’s 
Court of Philadelphia. While any individual’s refusal to work at the status quo rate of pay would 
have been perfectly legal, the coordinated and collective nature of the work stoppage swayed the 
court, and the strike was deemed an “unnatural” conspiracy detrimental to the public interest.2 
This analysis continued to control the courts’ view of organized labor through the Lochner Era, 
influenced heavily by the doctrine of “freedom of contract.”3 Even so, workers continued to 
attempt to organize, often resulting in violent and destructive confrontations with employers and 
leading courts to issue anti-labor injunctions as a matter of course for avoiding violent conflicts.
4
 
 As America’s industrial sector began to boom, industrial labor’s share of the labor market 
grew, and workers began to clash more regularly and more violently with their employers. 
Pressure mounted on Congress to change the violent and contentious state of affairs. In the 
interest of industrial peace and stability, Congress passed the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) in 
1926 to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry (one of the largest industries in the 
country, as well as one of the most violent labor-management relationships).
5
 The Railway Labor 
Act imposed two major procedural developments: when a railroad employer and its laborers 
found themselves unable to agree on contract terms, the RLA mandated that the parties submit to 
mediation before the 5-member National Mediation Board; when mediation failed, the RLA 
referred the dispute either to arbitration or to review by the executive branch.
6
 This represented 
                                                          
2
 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et. al., Labor Law In The Contemporary Workplace 17 (2009). 
3
 See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (MA 1896) (sustaining an injunction against picketing laborers 
demanding higher wages). 
4
 Dau-Schmidt et.al., Labor Law In The Contemporary Workplace, supra note 2, at 35. 
5
 See JON R. HUIBREGSTE, AMERICAN RAILROAD LABOR AND THE GENESIS OF THE NEW DEAL, 1919-1935 (2010). 
6
 Dau-Schmidt et.al., Labor Law In The Contemporary Workplace, supra note 2, at 41. 
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the first governmental recognition that labor interests played some role in forming the contracts 
at the center of Lochner-era rights. 
 The next major development in American labor law came in 1933. As the Great 
Depression rolled on, employers regularly and routinely reneged on pre-Depression promises, 
much to the chagrin of American workers.
7
 Coupled with the judiciary’s penchant for freely 
issuing employer-friendly injunctions, American workers found themselves utterly without 
recourse. Congress responded with the 1933 Norris-LaGuardia Act.
8
 The Norris-LaGuardia Act 
drastically expanded the tools available for workers to stand up and fight back against their 
employers. Specifically, it barred courts from issuing injunctions without specific findings of fact 
and outlawed “yellow-dog contracts” (individual employment contracts conditioned on the 
employee’s agreement not to join any labor organization).9 While the RLA was the first 
recognition of labor rights in general, the Norris-LaGuardia Act represented the first major 
expansion of those rights and signaled a significant shift in Congressional attitudes towards labor 
rights. 
 Significant though those earlier developments were, the largest expansion of labor rights 
came through the New Deal. In 1935, President Franklyn Roosevelt signed the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), colloquially known as the Wagner Act, into law. The NLRA, which still 
serves as the foundation for modern labor law, codified for the first time the right of workers to 
engage in collective action.
10
 §7 of the NLRA outlines the collective rights of workers, chief 
among them the rights to self-organize, to join labor organizations, and to engage in “concerted 
                                                          
7
 Id. at 44. 
8
 29 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. 
9
 Dau-Schmidt et.al., Labor Law In The Contemporary Workplace, supra note 2, at 44-45. 
10
 29 U.S.C. §§151 et. seq. 
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activity for mutual aid and protection.”11 §8 (now §8(a)), in turn, defined the unfair labor 
practices (“ULPs”) which employers were prohibited from committing, as well as the duties 
which they owed to their employees’ unions. These ULPs include interference with employee 
exercise of §7 rights, dominating or interfering with employee organizations, discriminating 
against employees based on union membership, retaliating against employees for exercising their 
rights under the NLRA, or failing to bargain in good faith with the union.
12
 The NLRA also 
established the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) to adjudicate ULP charges. The 
NLRA came under heavy scrutiny from America’s employer community, but the Supreme Court 
upheld the Act’s constitutionality in its effort to avoid President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, 
the fabled Switch In Time To Save The Nine.
13
 By upholding the validity of the NLRA, the 
Court firmly established that workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively would remain in 
force. 
 Unable to defeat the NLRA on constitutional grounds, opponents of union rights set their 
sights on the next best alternative: amending the NLRA itself. After years of attempting to 
establish a more business-friendly labor law regime, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Labor 
Management Relations Act in 1947. Taft-Hartley affirmed the rights of workers to abstain from 
collective activity, and explicitly added statutory protections for management rights.
14
 Taft-
Hartley’s most significant additions to the NLRA came in §8. Where §8 previously outlined only 
ULPs which management could commit against unions, Taft Hartley added §8(b), outlining 
ULPs which unions could commit against management. Those ULPs include coercing or 
restricting employees in their exercise of §7 protected activity, failure to bargain in good faith, 
                                                          
11
 29 U.S.C. §157. 
12
 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1-5). 
13
 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
14
 For example, while §7 of the NLRA affirmed the right of workers to engage in concerted activity, the Taft-Hartley 
amendments to the NLRA added that workers “shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activity.” 
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and interfering with another already-existing labor organization – all parallels of ULPs 
proscribed against management in §8(a).  Section 8(b) also contains, in subsection 8(b)(4) the 
prohibition against secondary economic activity. 
 The statutory language banning unions from engaging in certain economic advocacy is 
lengthy and complex. In addition to secondary activity, §8(b)(4) also bans unions from engaging 
in “hot cargo” agreements, strikes by some workers to promote unionization of other workers, or 
striking for better job assignments.
15
 On secondary activity, §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes  it a ULP for a 
labor organization 
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, 
where in either case an object thereof is [….] forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, 
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or 
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer 
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization.
16
 
 
 
Recognizing some of the constitutional ramifications of these restrictions Congress also included 
a proviso which explicitly excepts the rights of employees to honor other employees’ primary 
picket lines from those restrictions. It also permits employees to engage in “publicity, other than 
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public […] that a product or products are 
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute” without 
falling within the restriction.
17
 Applying this ban on the use of economic pressure against one 
employer to coerce concessions from a second, while also heeding the “truthful public appeals” 
proviso, has tended to present the Court with serious First Amendment issues. 
 
II. Jumping Through Hoops: A Doctrinal Approach to Secondary Activity 
                                                          
15
 Sections 8(b)(4)(ii)(A), (C), and (D), respectively. 
16
 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
17
 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4). 
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 The Supreme Court’s first serious consideration of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s validity came in its 
1964 Tree Fruits decision.
18
 A Washington fruit packing company, which sold its produce at 
SafeWay stores, was locked in a bitter labor dispute with its union. In response, the union 
initiated a consumer boycott campaign against the fruit packing company and began picketing 
and leafleting outside the SafeWay locations which sold the produce.
19
 The picket signs and 
leaflets made clear that the labor dispute was with the fruit packing company and not with 
SafeWay, and only encouraged consumers to boycott the apples produced by that specific 
packer.
20
 The NLRB found that the union had committed a ULP by engaging in secondary 
boycott and picketing activity in violation of §8(b)(4), and the case came to the Supreme Court 
on appeal. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan read the NLRB’s decision as “necessarily rest[ing] 
on the finding that Congress determined that such picketing always threatens, coerces or restrains 
the secondary employer.”21 The Court rejected that premise, relying heavily on statements made 
on the floor in Congress’ consideration of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and several amendments thereto. The 
Court cited to its past rulings, which held peaceful picketing to be constitutionally protected 
speech, and noted several instances in the floor debate on §8(b)(4) and its subsequent 
amendment in which legislators expressed desire that the ban not infringe on non-coercive 
protected speech.
22
 Most prominently, the Court noted a statement by Senator Edward Kennedy 
that the language of the proposed ban aimed to “prevent unions from appealing to the general 
public as consumers for assistance in a labor dispute” and constituted “a basic infringement upon 
                                                          
18
 N.L.R.B. v. Fruit And Vegetable Packers And Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). Tree Fruits is the 
colloquial name for this case. 
19
 Id. at 59-60. 
20
 Id. at 72. 
21
 Id. at 62. 
22
 Id. at 63-69. 
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freedom of expression.”23 The Senate then amended the bill to ban only coercive secondary 
activity and added the public appeals proviso. Brennan thus rejected the reading of §8(b)(4) that 
presumes all picketing to be coercive, and rather distinguishes between “persuasive” picketing 
which is not proscribed and “coercive or threatening” picketing which is proscribed.24 The Court 
found the activity in this case was “employed only to persuade customers not to buy the struck 
product” and was thus “closely confined to the primary dispute,” though the site of the appeal 
was “expanded to include the premises of the secondary employer.”25 The Court attempted to 
distinguish this activity from union activity “employed to persuade customers not to trade at all 
with the secondary employer,” which “inflict[s] injury on [the secondary employer’s] business 
generally. In such case, the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it creates a 
separate dispute with the secondary employer.”26 The Court thus held that §8(b)(4)’s ban on 
secondary picketing and boycotts did not proscribe the union activity at issue, and the NLRB’s 
decision was overturned.  
Justice Black concurred in the Tree Fruits Court’s judgment, but castigated the Court for 
failing to consider the facial constitutional issues raised by §8(b)(4). Justice Black saw the 
Court’s reliance on legislators’ statements in Congressional debates unconvincing in the face of 
the plain language of the law; picketing, in Justice Black’s reading, was nothing if not the 
dissemination of information about a labor dispute, and Congress’ intentions to place blanket 
bans on secondary labor picketing was evident on the face of the statute.
27
 If patrolling was 
inherently coercive and Congress wished to regulate it as such, this statute failed to do so 
explicitly, and relied instead on categorical content-based bans. “[T]he only patrolling” which 
                                                          
23
 Id. at 69. 
24
 Id. at 71. 
25
 Id. at 72. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. at 78. 
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§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) bans, in Justice Black’s reading, “is that which is carried on to advise the public, 
including consumers, that certain products have been produced by an employer with whom the 
picketers have a dispute.”28 Justice Black read the secondary picket and boycott ban as “a case in 
which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers express particular views,” 
and thus viewed the provision as unconstitutional restriction on speech.
29
 While Justice Black’s 
concurrence did not sway the Court in the Tree Fruits case, it does demonstrate that there have 
always been voices on the Court sympathetic to the argument that §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is 
unconstitutional. 
The next major step in the Court’s secondary activity jurisprudence attempted to apply 
the Tree Fruits distinction to a case of a neutral secondary that only sold products of the 
primary.
30
 In Safeco, a title insurance brokerage was being picketed by union in the midst of a 
labor dispute with Safeco Title Insurance Co. The brokerage sold policies insured by several title 
insurance providers, but derived roughly ninety percent of its business from the sale of Safeco.
31
 
The NLRB, applying Tree Fruits, held that the union’s picket and boycott were aimed only at the 
products of the primary and were thus protected, but the DC Circuit disagreed.
32
 In affirming the 
Circuit Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized that Tree Fruits was a case where the 
boycotted product was “but one item among the many that made up the retailer’s trade.”33 A case 
where the neutral deals only in the product of the secondary, like Safeco, was held to present the 
                                                          
28
 Id. at 78-79. 
29
 Id. at 79. 
30
 N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store Employees Local 100, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (colloquially referred to as Safeco). 
31
 Id. at 609. 
32
 Id. at 610-611. The constitutional concerns raised in this case are essentially identical to those presented in Tree 
Fruits, and the Court avoided them similarly. Tree Fruits implicitly hinted that the product/seller distinction would 
be blurred in a context where the seller dealt primarily in a single product. This was the Court’s first opportunity to 
actually rule on such a case. 
33
 Id. at 613. 
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neutral with “ruin or substantial loss.”34 This rendered the picket and boycott coercive in the eyes 
of the Court, and the Circuit Court’s ruling in favor of the insurance brokerage was sustained. 
The final piece of the Court’s fundamental §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) jurisprudence dealt with the 
shopping mall context.
35
 DeBartolo owned a shopping mall in which one store had contracted 
with a non-union contractor to do some construction work, and the union responded by 
peacefully leafleting the mall’s customers encouraging them not to shop at the mall at all.36 The 
Court of Appeals had declined to enforce the NLRB’s order holding that the union have violated 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and DeBartolo appealed. The Circuit Court based its decision on constitutional 
concerns. The Supreme Court, however, declined to rule on the statute’s constitutionality, instead 
relying on the peacefulness of the handbilling.
37
 The Court read the combination of 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the proviso as removing non-coercive handbilling from the scope of the ban 
on secondary activity.
38
 Despite the fact that its conclusion is far from the most natural reading 
of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B), the DeBartolo II Court held that “interpreting § 8(b)(4) as not reaching the 
handbilling involved in this case is not foreclosed either by the language of the section or its 
legislative history.”39 This allowed the Court to affirm the Court of Appeals’ central holding 
without reaching its serious constitutional implications. 
It is critical to note how vastly the plain language of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) differs from the 
Court’s doctrine. Under the plain language of the statute, any picketing or handbilling by a union 
                                                          
34
 Id. at 614-615. 
35
 Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v.Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Const. Trades Council., 485 U.S. 568 (1988). This opinion, 
referred to as DeBartolo II, is the second ruling of the Court on DeBartolo’s struggles with the union. The NLRB first 
held that the proviso for truthful consumer appeals protected the handbilling at issue here. In DeBartolo I, the 
Court remanded the case to the NLRB, holding that a general contractor is not a “producer” and its jobs are not 
“products” within the meaning of the proviso. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., 463 U.S. 147 
(1983). 
36
 Id. at 571. 
37
 Id. at 578. 
38
 Id. at 582-583. 
39
 Id. at 588. 
Kennedy - Free Speech For Some - 12 
 
that aims to drive business away from a secondary employer would be illegal unless it fell within 
the narrow scope of the consumer appeals proviso. The proviso explicitly does not protect 
picketing activity, but the Court still found that the picketing in Tree Fruits was not proscribed. 
The DeBartolo II Court found that secondary boycott activity against the DeBartolo Corporation 
was legal despite the fact that it had already held the activity to be outside the scope proviso. The 
activity in Safeco was only held to be proscribed because it was “coercive” because of its 
prospective impact on the secondary employer’s business. This set of results does not comply 
with the language of §8(b)(4). In fact, it has been pointed out that these results are consistent 
with a pure First Amendment analysis, which could be applied even without §8(b)(4)’s 
application. The First Amendment allows regulation of protected expression where that 
expression is intended to incite an unlawful boycott.
40
 Most significantly, the Court has 
recognized that freedom of expression may be restricted incidentally, where a substantial non-
expression reason for a policy exists, or directly, in order to avoid incitement.
41
 This doctrine 
prohibits confrontational or coercive appeals, but would permit peaceful and lawful picketing 
and handbilling to continue – as the Court already has.42 Finally, misleading consumer appeals 
can be regulated under already-validated defamation law, eliminating the need for the proviso’s 
exclusion of non-truthful appeals.
43
  
The Court has routinely ignored the plain language of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Instead, it has 
doctrinally applied principles consistent with a pure First Amendment analysis and reached 
results consistent with First Amendment doctrine. This suggests that the Court has long been 
                                                          
40
 Michael C. Harper, First Amendment Protection For Union Appeals to Consumers, 27 WIS. J. L. GEN. SOC’Y 176, 190 
(2012). 
41
 On incidental restriction, see U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). On anti-incitement restrictions, see 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
42
 Harper, supra note 40, at 201-202. 
43
 Id. at 202. 
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aware of the shaky constitutional foundations underlying §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and, rather than 
explicitly strike the provision down, have found ways to makes its decisions on pure First 
Amendment grounds instead of the statute. 
 
III. Economic or Political? Longshoremen, The NAACP, And Political Issue Advocacy 
 In 1982, the Supreme Court decided two cases that highlight the ways the Court has 
attempted to distinguish labor activity outlawed by §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) from legal secondary boycotts 
by other speakers. The first decision, handed down in April 1982, dealt with a secondary boycott 
spearheaded by a labor union. In 1980, President Carter announced that the Soviet Union was 
under partial embargo due to its invasion of Afghanistan. Mere days later, the International 
Longshoremen’s Association (“ILA”) announced that its members would treat the Soviet Union 
as under total embargo and would refuse to handle, load, or unload goods directed to or from the 
Soviet Union, as well as any goods transported on Russian ships.
44
 Allied International imported 
Russian wood; Allied contracted with a second company to ship the wood to the US from 
Russia; the shipping company contracted with yet a third company which hired ILA members to 
unload the shipments.
45
 As a result, Allied had to renegotiate its contracts with Russia, greatly 
decreasing its wood supplies and threatening its ability to meet customer demand.
46
 Allied sued 
the ILA for engaging in an illegal secondary boycott. The District Court dismissed the claim on 
grounds that the ILA had not engaged in an illegal secondary boycott, but the First Circuit 
reversed, finding that the boycott’s impact was “in commerce.” As a result, the boycott fell 
within the restrictions of §8(b)(4) despite its political purpose and was not protected speech.
47
 
                                                          
44
 International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Intern, Inc., 452 U.S. 212, 214 (1982). 
45
 Id. at 215. 
46
 Id.  
47
 Id. at 217-218. 
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 The Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit. It found that Allied and its contractors 
were “in commerce,” and that the impact of the boycott was designed to obstruct that commerce. 
As such, Congress had jurisdiction to prohibit such boycotts within the commerce power.
48
 The 
Court also found that the boycotts fell squarely within §8(b)(4)(ii)(B); the ILA had no dispute 
with Allied or its contractors, and its sole complaint was with the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan.
49
 While the Court showed some sympathy with the “understandable and even 
commendable” goals of the ILA boycott, it ultimately found that the “certain effect of its action 
[was] to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers.”50 Even if the ends of the boycott were 
legitimate and the ethical and moral foundations solid, the Court found, “the pressure on 
secondary parties must be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott.”51 Quoting the 
NLRB’s opinion on the matter, the Court concluded that “it is difficult to imagine a situation that 
falls more squarely within” the NLRA secondary boycott ban.52 
In holding that §8(b)(4) proscribed the ILA boycott, the Court rejected the argument that 
political boycotts should be excepted from the ban. From the statutory perspective, the Court 
noted that the ban’s express language provides no limitation which would except political 
boycotts.
53
 From a constitutional perspective, the Court saw little difficulty in ruling that 
applying the ban to the ILA boycott would not infringe the ILA’s First Amendment rights to 
political activity. Still relying on the “commercial” nature of the ILA’s activity, the Court noted 
that secondary picketing had routinely been held to fall outside the scope of First Amendment 
                                                          
48
 Id. at 218-219. 
49
 Id. at 222-223. 
50
 Id. at 223. 
51
 Id. at 224. 
52
 Id. at 223. 
53
 Id. at 225. 
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protection, and emphasized the idea that coercive activity was unworthy of protection. 
54
 
Because “there [were] many ways in which a union and its individual members [could] express 
their opposition to Russian foreign policy without infringing upon the rights of others,” the Court 
had no problem applying §8(b)(4) to the ILA boycott without giving any serious attention to the 
ILA’s First Amendment concerns.55 
Just a few short months after the Longshoremen decision was issued, the Court issued its 
opinion on the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s boycott of white 
businesses in Mississippi who refused to hire African-Americans.
56
 A group of black citizens in 
Port Gibson, Mississippi, presented local governmental officials with demands for desegregation 
in early 1966, which were largely ignored. The NAACP voted to boycott local white businesses, 
and several of those businesses sued to recover some of the resulting damages from the NAACP 
and its supporters, as well as injunctive relief to prevent future boycotts.
57
 The trial court (a 
Mississippi state chancery court) held that the boycott violated antitrust laws, constituted tortious 
interference with business, and violated the state’s blanket ban on secondary boycotts; the trial 
court explicitly rejected the boycotters’ arguments that their activity was protected by the First 
Amendment.
58
 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the tort liability holding, but 
rejected the other two theories; significantly, it rejected the secondary boycott theory because the 
statute was passed once the boycott had already been in effect for two years, not based on the 
merits of the claim.
59
 The court held, though, that violence, threats, or force could still impose 
tort liability, and it found that the NAACP boycott had occasionally involved threats, thus 
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condemning the entire enterprise.
60
 Most significantly, one of the boycott’s organizers publicly 
threatened to “break [black people’s] damn neck[s]” if they were caught “going in any of them 
racist stores.”61 The Mississippi Court also rejected the boycotters First Amendment defense, 
holding that violence or threats of violence precluded First Amendment protection.
62
 
The Supreme Court of the United States roundly disagreed with the Mississippi Supreme 
Court. While the state court saw the boycott as generally violent by virtue of some violent 
conduct, the Court found it to be generally peaceful. The Court found that  
[t]he few marches associated with the boycott were carefully controlled by black leaders. Pickets used to 
advertise the boycott were often small children. The police made no arrests—and no complaints are 
recorded—in connection with the picketing and occasional demonstrations supporting the boycott. Such 
activity was fairly irregular, occurred primarily on weekends, and apparently was largely discontinued 
around the time the lawsuit was filed.
63
 
 
The Court did, however, identify ten or so incidents of threatening or violent discipline targeted 
at those who violated the boycott.
64
 The Court found that the boycott comprised of the economic 
campaign proper, as well as speeches and peaceful pickets in its support – each of which on their 
own, the Court stated, entitled to First Amendment protection.
65
 On the aggregate of these 
activities, the Court strongly emphasized the importance of associational rights to American 
political discourse and public issue advocacy.
66
 On the minority element of the boycott that had 
resorted to violence, the Court remarked that “the right to associate does not lose all 
constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may have participated in 
conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected.”67 The Court also reinforced its earlier 
holding that peaceful picketing, like boycotts, is First Amendment protected activity absent some 
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other reason for restriction.
68
 In total, the Court found that “through speech, assembly, and 
petition—rather than through riot or revolution—[the boycotters] sought to change a social order 
that had consistently treated them as second-class citizens,” and that such activity was entitled to 
First Amendment protection.
69
 
 The Court also weighed in on the possibility that the law could validly place incidental 
restrictions on otherwise-protected activity in certain circumstances. The Court noted its previous 
holdings affirming “the strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, 
even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association”; 
the Court particularly noted that such interests include curtailing inter-company collusion and 
maintaining industrial stability through labor regulations.
70
 However, the Court distinguished the 
NAACP boycott from those cases. Here, the Court held, the NAACP and its supporters had a 
right to engage in peaceful political activity on public issues, and that the government had no 
interest which could outweigh that right.
71
 Due to the importance of protecting the right to issue-
based advocacy which the NAACP and its supporters were exercising in this case, the Court 
refused to impose any liability on the boycotters and upheld the boycott’s First Amendment 
protected status. 
 The similarities between the NAACP boycott and the longshoremen’s boycott are 
striking. Both sought to alter the political or military policies of a government; the NAACP 
aimed to alter municipal civil rights law, while the ILA aimed to protest the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. Both organizations chose to pursue those goals through wielding their 
memberships’ collective economic power, and did so with reasonable degrees of success. In 
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doing so, both harmed the business of supposedly-neutral third parties whose business activities 
helped to support the political activities which the boycotts targeted. In the Court’s eyes, 
however, these boycotts were distinguishable. The labor boycott of the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan was deemed to be coercive commercial activity, despite the fact that it involved no 
violence, intimidation, or threats thereof, and was thus outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection. The NAACP boycott of local white-owned businesses, on the other hand, was 
deemed protected political activism. This holding stood despite the fact that the NAACP boycott 
did include intimidation and threats of violence, however infrequent or inconsequential they may 
have been. Even though both boycotts targeted political actors’ political policies, and even 
though both campaigns consisted of otherwise-protected activity, the labor boycott was deemed 
to carry implicit economic coercion by virtue of its status as labor speech while the non-labor 
boycott was protected as political speech. 
 Distinguishing labor picketing from issue picketing on the grounds that labor picketing is 
“economic” while issue picketing is “political” is utterly impracticable. The Court attempted that 
distinction due to its long-held view that, in the realm of free speech protection, commercial 
speech is the least protected while political speech is the most protected.
72
 If the Court could find 
a way to distinguish economic labor pickets and boycotts from political issue pickets and 
boycotts, it follows, §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) can be preserved as totally consistent with the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.
73
 Unfortunately for constitutional avoidance advocates, and despite 
the Court’s best efforts at making that distinction, labor picketing and boycott activity still bear a 
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significantly greater resemblance to political activity than commercial activity.
74
 Making this 
distinction requires the acceptance of the premise labor relations are driven entirely by 
economics. That premise is deeply flawed. When unions undertake secondary boycotts, it is 
rarely if ever intended for purely economic reasons. The socio-economic ramifications of the 
underlying labor disputes are typically the more significant motivator of the boycott or picket.
75
 
It is totally impracticable, as a matter of legal doctrine, to distinguish between a boycott 
campaign that advocates for increased wages or better working conditions and a campaign that 
advocates for race or gender parity.
76
 The right to a safer working environment or better payment 
is just as crucial a political right as the gender and race policies targeted by so-called “political” 
boycott campaigns. “For the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that secondary labor 
picketing does not fall under the auspices of the First Amendment’s protection of political 
speech,” as such, “is nothing less than a failure to acknowledge the larger socio-political reality 
in which workers exist.”77 Attempting to distinguish labor campaigns as apolitical economic 
activity, subject only to the least stringent First Amendment protection, is not realistic or 
predictable. The purported distinction cannot be applied without a tortured logic, and it only 
serves to impermissibly discriminate against labor activity.  
 Even if the distinction could be practicably applied, this content-based approach, which 
bans peaceful labor boycotts and pickets purely because they involve a “labor dispute” (in a 
broad sense) while permitting even violent political campaigns that are otherwise identical to 
their labor counterparts, does not comport with the Court’s own doctrine. Suppression of speech 
is permitted only in narrow circumstances; specifically, speech may only be restricted when the 
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restriction is within constitutional power, furthers an important or substantial government interest 
which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, and the restriction must be as narrowly 
tailored as possible.
78
 When using this analysis to differentiate between a primary and secondary 
boycott, one must consider what the interests of a target of a boycott generally will be and 
determine the degree to which those interests are different when the boycott is “secondary.”79 
Any business, to be sure, has a cognizable interest in continued operation. However, absent an 
explicit contract guaranteeing continued patronage, no business has a protectable interest in 
continued business with its current customers.
80
 In any isolated transaction, the customer has the 
right to choose where to take his or her business. Whether that decision is based on the service 
provider’s labor practices, political advocacy, or any other factor, the decision is up to the 
consumer. By convincing customers not to patronize the secondary party, the boycott has not 
infringed any cognizable interest of that secondary. 
 This highlights a second major misunderstanding in the Court’s secondary boycott 
jurisprudence: which party is granted the right not to be coerced. All of the Court’s 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) jurisprudence, particularly Safeco, emphasize the right of the neutral secondary 
not to be coerced. Coercion in the labor context is judged with the “ruin or substantial loss” test, 
which places the analytical focus on the boycott’s results.81 Compare this with the standard in all 
non-labor boycotts: where the O’Brien standard is used, coercion is judged by the campaign’s 
methods and intentions, not the boycott’s success.82 Applying these different tests leads to absurd 
results. A successful labor boycott is coercive if it is successful, no matter what methods were 
used; on the other hand, a labor boycott that unsuccessfully attempts to violently coerce 
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consumers using methods which would be illegal in other contexts is protected, because its 
unsuccessful boycott did not meet the substantial loss standard. This problem can be assuaged by 
focusing on the methods that labor campaigns use rather than their results, as the Court does in 
the non-labor context. This, however, requires an analysis radically different from the text of 
§8(b)(4). To be sure, an unsuccessful boycott that utilizes violent and coercive means may still 
violate other laws without violating 8(b)(4); however, if boycotts by such coercive methods are 
already illegal regardless of their practical impacts, §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) serves only to prohibit 
peaceful labor demonstration that would be protected if conducted by a non-labor speaker. The 
Court’s analyses of secondary labor boycotts also mistakenly considers whether the consumers 
are coerced, despite the fact that the plain language of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) grants the secondary the 
right not to be coerced. The more logical approach, focusing on the boycott’s methods rather 
than its results, is already codified in O’Brien. In other words, striking down §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and 
merely applying the Court’s existing First Amendment doctrines and existing restrictions on 
coercive activity to secondary labor boycotts would solve the current absurdities. 
 The Court’s failed attempts to salvage §8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s constitutionality by 
distinguishing labor-based secondary boycotts from similar boycotts in other areas have created a 
vortex of uncertainty and absurdity. The 1982 Supreme Court term demonstrates the 
discriminatory results of the distinction perfectly: a sometimes-violent “political” boycott was 
deemed legal and protected, while a peaceful labor boycott was deemed coercive and 
unprotected. The distinction must logically fail. The arguments on which the distinction is based 
are internally inconsistent, and the results of its application are absurd and discriminatory. On its 
face, §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) singles out labor and punishes it for engaging in a successful boycott that 
would have been legal if run by non-labor interests, while also permitting labor to engage in 
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otherwise illegal campaign tactics so long as they do not succeed. This distinction is utterly 
impracticable. Legal doctrine regarding secondary labor boycotts and pickets would be brought 
into consistency with the rest of the Court’s boycott rulings by openly doing what the Court has 
effectively already done, as discussed in the previous section: recognizing that §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
unconstitutionally discriminates against labor speech in violation of the First Amendment, 
striking it down, and instead applying its existing First Amendment framework for boycott 
analysis. 
 
IV. Look Who’s Talking: Citizens United And Speaker Discrimination 
 Regardless of whether the Court’s doctrinal approach to §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is sufficiently 
constitutionally based or intellectually consistent, the Court’s recent First Amendment 
jurisprudence should still cause jurists to revisit the statute’s constitutionality. In its Citizens 
United decision, which most in the labor world were quick to castigate, the Court held that 
corporate election expenditures were speech and could not be banned only because the speaker 
was a corporation.
83
 The Court, however, ruled on the issue in terms much broader than a mere 
response to the case at bar. The rules of law, and resulting holdings, employed by the Court were 
painted in broad categorical statements. The Court explicitly ruled that a speaker cannot be 
banned from speaking because of who the speaker is. The opinion begins from the premise that 
“[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy” because “it is the means to hold officials 
accountable to the people.”84 The Court notes that the First Amendment is based in a 
foundational mistrust of governmental restrictions of speech along either viewpoint or speaker 
lines. The First Amendment, as the Court read it, necessarily prohibits “restrictions 
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distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. As instruments 
to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the 
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”85 Turning to the issue of corporate 
speech, the Court continued to rule in broad strokes. Rather than addressing only corporations, 
the Court held that “[c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 
discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas,” and thus rejected the 
argument that the “political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not natural 
persons.”86 From there, the Court gives an extensive history of federal and state bans on 
“independent expenditures by corporations and labor unions.”87 The Court thus deemed 
association speech to be just as deserving of First Amendment protection as individual speech 
and rejected the premise that the government could justifiably discriminate against speakers 
purely because they were associations. 
 The Court also reconsidered its earlier holdings on corporate campaign finance 
restrictions. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court had applied an 
“anti-distortion” rationale to preserve restrictions on corporate election expenditure limits; the 
government, Austin concluded, had a cognizable interest in keeping floods of corporate money 
from distorting public discourse and could prevent corporate contributions above a certain 
amount.
88
 The Citizens United Court roundly rejected that rationale. It noted, significantly, that 
“[if] the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to 
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ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association.”89 Several of the cases cited by 
the Court in support of that conclusion, it is worth noting, were cases which affirmed the rights 
of unions to engage in political activity.
90
 The Citizens United Court held, finally, that Austin’s 
rationale impermissibly interfered with the First Amendment’s open marketplace of ideas and 
would permit “the government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of 
citizens.”91 This result was unacceptable to the Court, and the Court thus accepted a speaker-
blind approach to judging speech protections. 
 By eviscerating its earlier jurisprudence distinguishing between association and 
individual speakers, the Court destroyed any proverbial “leg” on which §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) could 
stand. In its discussion of Austin, the Court ignored Austin’s language regarding the “crucial 
differences” between corporations and unions.92 In doing so, the Court opened the door for 
unions to take advantage of the new First Amendment regime. In an earlier opinion, the Court 
had held a non-picketing ordinance which only allowed labor picketing to be unconstitutional.
93
 
In doing so, the Court saw the ordinance as an “impermissible distinction between labor 
picketing and other peaceful picketing.”94 Following Citizens United, this distinction cuts both 
ways. Just as the government could not privilege labor activity above all others, the rules 
motivating Citizens United mandate that labor activity cannot be singled out for punishment or 
ban. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA does this explicitly. A political secondary boycott legal 
when not organized by a union, as in the Claiborne Hardware context, becomes illegal merely 
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by virtue of its speaker’s union identity.95 Merely implementing time-place-and-manner 
restrictions of general applicability would do as good (if not better) of a job at avoiding industrial 
strife and maintaining labor peace, and would do so without implicating any of these First 
Amendment concerns.
96
 These restrictions would necessarily have to comply with established 
legal precepts of speech protection; broad latitude would need to be granted to boycott organizers 
so as to avoid the general chilling of speech, but restrictions on boycotts that already raise 
concerns of coercion under the existing doctrines discussed earlier could be restricted without 
regard to their speaker. Those restrictions would do well as, if not better than, §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) at 
accomplishing the goal of preventing overly coercive political boycotts, and would do so without 
discriminating against labor unions on account of their organizational identity. As a result, 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) cannot survive the strict scrutiny standard which Citizens United would apply to 
such speaker-based discrimination and must be struck down accordingly. 
 Citizens United also brought the political-economic speech distinctions formerly applied 
in the secondary boycott context into question in fundamental ways. Where the hierarchal ladder 
of First Amendment protection formerly placed commercial speech “on a rung below [political 
speech with] labor speech relegated to a ‘black hole’ beneath the ladder,”97 Citizens United 
applied a more categorical, speaker-neutral approach.
98
 Prior to Citizens United, commercial 
speech could be regulated only if it failed the Central Hudson Gas & Electric test; that is to say, 
truthful commercial speech about a legal activity could be regulated via legislation which 
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directly furthered a “substantial interest.”99 In other words, commercial speech regulation was 
subject only to intermediate scrutiny. Any speech with an economic or commercial goal, then, 
could be regulated more easily than purely political speech, even if the commercial speech had 
political elements. That was particularly true of corporations, whose very existence was for the 
purpose of producing commercial profit. Any speech, political or otherwise, made by 
corporations was inherently commercial at least in part, which made the speech commercial for 
purposes of regulation. Citizens United, however, explicitly ruled that economic motivations do 
not render political speech non-political, and that speech with both commercial and political 
motivations was still political and thus worthy of greater protection.
100
 Only the speech itself is 
subject to scrutiny in Citizens United, and the Court outlawed considerations of who the speaker 
was and why the speaker was speaking. By categorically barring future Courts from considering 
the speaker’s identity and motivations for speaking, Citizens United requires that strict scrutiny 
be applied even when the speech being regulated is made by a commercial actor. While Citizens 
United focuses on the subject of donations to political campaigns, its internal logic blurs the lines 
of distinction between political and commercial speech, and at the very least it calls the old 
categorical distinctions into question. 
 It is certainly true that proponents of labor speech restrictions could reasonably argue that 
such a broad, categorical reading of the holdings of Citizens United is misplaced. The case, they 
would argue, dealt only with issues of corporate campaign expenditures, and any language in 
broader terms is mere dicta. While that may be true, the method by which the Court comes to its 
conclusions is just as important as those conclusions themselves. Justice Kennedy could have 
couched his opinion in much narrower terms. He could merely have written that political 
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contributions are political speech, that corporations are legal persons, and thus that corporate 
contributions could not be regulated differently from individual contributions. While he could 
have written his opinion that way, he did not. It was Justice Kennedy, not advocates of the broad 
reading of the case, who raised labor unions as the legal equivalent of corporations, and it was 
Justice Kennedy who phrased his opinion in such broad terms. While the case does have narrow 
holdings, it is important to understand the rules that the Court used to reach those holdings. In 
this case, though the rules lead to certain specific results in the instant case, the rules themselves 
are expressed in terms which are applicable to a greater array of situations. Thus far, advocates 
of the narrow reading of Citizens United have not cogently expressed a compelling argument for 
ignoring the broad terms of the opinion. 
Where Citizens United merely questioned the regulatory distinctions between commercial 
and political speech, the Court further eroded the distinction and protected commercial speech in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
101
 Vermont had a medical privacy law restricting the sale, disclosure, 
and use of pharmacies’ records to reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors, which 
the Court held unconstitutional.
102
 The Court could have merely applied the traditional Central 
Hudson test to the regulation, which likely would not have survived Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny, and arrived at the same result.
103
 Instead, the Court applied heightened 
scrutiny, more in line with its Citizens Untied rationale.
104
 This analysis provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the interconnectedness of political and economic speech. Political and 
economic issues overlap. By ignoring the speaker’s identity and motivations, be they economic 
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or political, speech becomes the focus of the inquiry and can be scrutinized without 
discrimination. 
Under this framework, even if the economic-political dichotomy discussed earlier in this 
paper were a practicable justification for sustaining §8(b)(4)(ii)(B), it is now inconsistent with 
and overruled by Citizens United and Sorrell. Commercial speech and political speech are in the 
same protected category under this new framework: namely, speech in general, regardless of 
motivation. That the organizer behind an otherwise-protected secondary boycott is a labor 
organization or that such a boycott is motivated by the economics central to labor relations is 
now irrelevant to the analysis. Rather, Citizens United and Sorrell mandate that we look only at 
the speech and apply strict scrutiny in analyzing any restriction of that speech. For 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to survive such an inquiry, there must be some meaningful difference between 
labor secondary boycotts and other secondary boycotts. The only plausible differences, as this 
paper has discussed at some length, are the speaker’s identity or the categorization of labor 
boycotts as commercial speech rather than political speech. The Citizens United doctrine rejects 
both of these distinctions out of hand. The businesses harmed by labor’s boycotts could argue 
that the harm to their business precludes First Amendment protection for those boycotts. The 
same Court that decided Citizens United, however, has already held that the public harm done by 
restricting speech must be offset by some greater public harm if the speech were permitted to 
continue; private harm alone cannot per se offset the public harm of chilling speech.
105
 Even if 
the Court’s earlier jurisprudence were wrongfully deemed consistent and practicable, the rules 
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developed in Citizens United and its progeny mandate that §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) be struck down as 
unconstitutional identity-based censorship. 
 
V. Conclusion: A Long Road Ahead 
 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on secondary pickets and boycotts as First 
Amendment speech outside the labor context is quite straightforward. As best exemplified in the 
Claiborne Hardware case, the Court has found that boycotts are critical vehicles for political 
speech and has afforded them the full extent of the First Amendment’s protections, even where 
they target purportedly neutral secondary businesses. Those protections, under the Court’s 
doctrines, cannot be permissibly withheld based only on the speaker’s identity or the speech’s 
content. The Court has recognized that categorical bans on certain types of speech – whether 
based on content or speaker – serves to censor particular viewpoints and chill speech generally. 
This violates the fundamental principles underlying the First Amendment. 
 Thus far, when the Court has had the opportunity to rule on these issues relating to labor 
speakers engaged in secondary boycotts, it has ignored those principles. The Court has tied itself 
in knots to justify §8(b)(4)(ii)(B), finding that labor speech is commercial and not political and 
stripping it of First Amendment protections. This distinction rests solely on the speaker’s identity 
and speech’s content. If an identical boycott were organized by any actor besides unions, or if the 
boycott arose in a context other than a labor dispute, the speech would be given the utmost 
protection under the First Amendment as political speech. Because the speech concerns a labor 
dispute, and because the speech is made by a labor organization, §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) strips it of its 
First Amendment protected status, and the Court has thus far acquiesced. 
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 As the Court’s holdings on First Amendment issues have progressed, the shaky 
foundations of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s constitutionality have only eroded farther, and the current Court 
is perfectly situated to finally strike it down. The Roberts Court has routinely emphasized the 
importance of extending First Amendment protections to as much speech as possible. In Citizens 
United, the Court explicitly repudiated the old idea that associational (specifically union and 
corporate) speech could be regulated differently from individual speech. In Sorrell, the Court 
eliminated the old distinctions between commercial and political speech, holding that even 
commercial speech could have a political element deserving of protection. In Snyder, the Roberts 
Court affirmed that these protections even extend to some speech that causes immense private 
harm in order to avoid the public harm of chilling speech. Even against the backdrop of the old 
commercial-political dichotomy, the Roberts Court has made clear that First Amendment rights 
should be given the greatest protection. Given the opportunity, if this Court were to be presented 
with a §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) case, a consistent application of its own jurisprudence would force the 
Roberts Court to strike down §8(b)(4). 
 Of course, one must remain cognizant of the Court’s political realities. The Roberts Court 
has, like many Courts before it, routinely proven hostile to labor interests, and that tendency is 
not out of line with the Court’s historical position. Historically, Supreme Court decisions on 
labor issues have been based “not on statutory language or legislative history, but instead on 
frequently unstated assumptions and values about the economic system and the prerogatives of 
capital, and corollary assumptions about the rights and obligations of employees.”106 The Court 
typically privileges continuity of production and economic activity over workers’ NLRA rights. 
Rather than defer to free speech rights except in the face of explicit language restricting them, as 
the Court typically does, the Court typically does the opposite in the labor context; economic 
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productivity and continuity are to be maintained from interference, even at the cost of employee 
speech rights, unless Congress explicitly codifies the right to interfere.
107
  
It is not difficult to imagine how the Roberts Court would decide a case calling 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) into question. The majority opinion would likely be authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts or Justice Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, or Thomas. The opinion would reiterate that the labor 
relations field has traditionally been viewed as purely economic and totally apolitical. 
Confronted with the language of Citizens United and its progeny, the Court would distinguish the 
context of one-on-one bargaining in the labor relations field from the implications of 
electioneering activities for the public at large. A campaign expenditure or ad buy, which were 
the focus of Citizens United, necessarily implicates sociopolitical issues by virtue of its role in 
the electoral and political process. The contract between one union local and its employer, the 
Court would argue, has no implications beyond the relationship between the employer and the 
union. In fact, the Court would likely note that the “union” is a legal fiction, existing only to 
collectively bargain for employment contracts on behalf of the individual members; in that 
framework, a collective bargaining agreement is nothing but an aggregation of many individual 
employment agreements. Finally, the Court would likely articulate once again that the state has a 
compelling interest in preserving continuity of industrial productivity. In so doing, it would 
likely enumerate the proverbial “parade of horribles” that would follow from allowing unions to 
disrupt productivity not just of their employers but of anyone who does business with them. 
While the validity of using “economic weapons” in collective bargaining has long been 
established,
108
 the Roberts Court would likely articulate that their validity is confined to the 
direct labor dispute. To open up any and all business partners of a given employer up to 
                                                          
107
 Id. at 277. 
108
 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
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vulnerability to those economic weapons would risk vast economic shutdown over what should 
have been a very limited labor dispute. With those arguments laid out, the Court would hold that 
§8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is a necessary restraint on the inherently coercive, purely commercial power of 
union activity and thus justified. 
These arguments are not only specious and impracticable, but also internally inconsistent. 
In order to categorize labor disputes as purely commercial and totally apolitical, the Court must 
hold that labor disputes are isolated to a single employer-employee relationship. However, the 
Court must simultaneously hold that the dispute’s ramifications are potentially far-reaching in 
order to justify §8(b)(4)’s speech restrictions under strict scrutiny’s requirement that the state 
interest be compelling. If the labor dispute is so isolated, surely there is no concern that it would 
reach so far as to mandate a blanket prohibition on secondary activity. These arguments also 
totally ignore the Court’s general boycott jurisprudence outside the labor context. Confronted 
with similarly situated economic boycotts for political reasons like that in Clairborne 
Hardware), producing a parade of horribles identical to the parade that would flow from 
secondary labor activity, the Court has already held that the necessity for speech protection 
vastly outweighs the state’s interest in economic continuity. As discussed above, even though the 
activism happens in the context of union bargaining, secondary boycott activity has the same 
broad-reaching political aims when conducted by a union as it does in the civil rights context: to 
improve working conditions and open up new opportunities for historically oppressed classes in 
society. Union boycotts certainly do have some economic and commercial bases, but they also 
have crucial political ramifications. The Roberts Court has consistently held that political 
motivation extends First Amendment protection to associational speech, even if there are also 
economic motivations. The Citizens United and Sorrell decisions explicitly require that these 
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protections be extended to all speakers – be they unions, corporations, or otherwise. Finally, the 
Roberts Court cannot logically overcome its holding in Snyder, which mandates that speech can 
only be deliberately restricted when the private harm done by the speech exceeds the public harm 
done by restricting the speech. In order to restrict union speech in this context, the Court must 
ignore decades of jurisprudence on political boycotts and the First Amendment speech rights 
associated with them. Undermining long-established speech protection is surely a tremendous 
public harm which could not outweigh the slight extension of some labor disputes. It is doubtful 
that the logical inconsistencies in its own arguments would dissuade this Court from holding by 
them, but the inconsistencies are none-the-less fatal to a consistent application of the Court’s 
doctrines. 
The Court’s jurisprudence on this issue has long been a tightrope walk between that 
mentality and the rest of its First Amendment rulings. The Court in general, and the Roberts 
Court specifically, has long viewed labor speakers as a class unto themselves, inherently 
economic actors without political aims and inherently coercive by their mere existence and 
activity. A thorough understanding of the Court’s treatment of labor speech, particularly of 
secondary boycott and picket activity, reveals inconsistencies between the way labor speakers 
are treated relative to other speakers, as well as in the arguments used to drive those distinctions. 
Those inconsistencies have only been deepened by the Roberts Court’s drastic expansion of First 
Amendment protections for associational speakers like unions and corporations. If the rules 
driving those decisions were applied uniformly to unions as they are to corporations, the Court 
would be forced to recognize that its legitimizations of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) are an anomaly within its 
First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly as regards boycotts in general. However, there is 
still a deep gulf between that logical consistency and the way the Court treats labor speakers. 
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Only time will tell which side of that gulf the Roberts Court – and the Courts to follow – will end 
up on. 
